Comments are more than welcome!
ABSTRACT: This report presents the results of a replication, with 199 culturally-diverse subjects, of Thomas Schelling’s (1957) experiments on tacit coordination. Section 1 introduces the concept of focal point equilibrium selection in tacit one-shot symmetric pure coordination games, as presented by Schelling in his classic article; it then traces its subsequent exploration through experimental research, shows how it has been explained, particularly in terms of culture, and relates that kind of explanation to the experimental and null hypotheses of the present study and its associated predictions. Section 2 describes the design of the intercultural tacit coordination experiment, and section 3 the results. Finally, section 4 presents a very preliminary discussion of the implications of the experiment’s results in terms of the cultural explanation of focal point equilibrium selection.
An Experiment on Intercultural Tacit Coordination - Preliminary Report
Towards a behavioral macroeconomics: a short review of George Akerlof
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George A. Akerlof was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics, along with A. Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz, for his analyses of markets with asymmetric information. This recognition derives directly from his pioneering and influential article on “the market for lemons” (Akerlof 1970). According to Akerlof (2001a), the study of asymmetric information
“.. was a very first step toward the realization of a dream. That dream was the development of a behavioral macroeconomics in the original spirit of Keynes’ General Theory. Macroeconomics would then no longer suffer from the ad hockery of the neoclassical synthesis, which had over-ridden the emphasis in The General Theory on the role of psychological and sociological factors, such as cognitive bias, reciprocity, fairness, herding, and social status. My dream was to strengthen macroeconomic theory by incorporating assumptions honed to the observation of such behavior.” (365)
This concern with resurrecting the “animal spirits” that imbue Keynes’ General Theory – which has been a distinctive and enduring characteristic of Akerlof’s work (see Akerlof and Shiller 2009) – derives from his early interest to build “a theory that is more closely linked to substantial policy issues and less tied to the official (competitive general equilibrium) model and its assumptions” (Akerlof 2001b). Akerlof relates his gradual engagement with this academic viewpoint to his interest in history, which he claims has informed his research agenda, as well as to his short – albeit intense – involvement in journalism, and to the experiences he had while working in India.
Akerlof sees the development of behavioral macroeconomics as contributing novel and useful answers to questions which the New Classical synthesis has failed, in his view, to explain. It does so by replacing traditional utility-maximizing assumptions with empirical observations from psychology and sociology.
In his analyses of unemployment, Akerlof has been one of the proponents of the “efficiency wage” theory (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 1990), and has brought into his models concepts such as reciprocity (akin to the anthropological analysis of gift exchange), fairness and adherence to social norms.
In a similar vein, Akerlof has also devised ways to incorporate research and concepts from psychology (money illusion, loss aversion, herding, rules of thumb, cognitive parsimony, salience and hyperbolic discounting) into macroeconomic models that account for the effects of governmental intervention in the economy (Akerlof and Yellen 1985a and b), for observed regularities between unemployment and inflation (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996, 2000) and to an analysis of saving behavior (Akerlof 1991).
More recently Akerlof has been doing research which relates poverty and self-destructive behavior to the identity of individuals of historically excluded minorities, such as African Americans in the U.S. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
REFERENCES
Akerlof 1970. “The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics; 84, pp. 488–500.
Akerlof 1982. “ Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, pp. 543–69.
Akerlof 1991. “Procrastination and Obedience,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 81, pp. 1–19.
Akerlof 2001a. Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, 2001.
Akerlof 2001b. Autobigraphy at http://nobelprize.org/
Akerlof, William T. Dickens and George L. Perry 1996. William T. Dickens and George L. Perry, “The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:1, pp. 1–59.
Akerlof, William T. Dickens and George L. Perry 2000. ”Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting and the Long-Run Phillips Curve,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:1, pp. 1–44.
Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton 2000. “Economics and Identity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, pp. 715–53.
Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller 2009. Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen 1985a. “A Near-rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, pp. 823–38.
Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen 1985b. “Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?” American Economic Review, 75, pp. 708–20.
Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen 1990. “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 255–83.
George A. Akerlof was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics, along with A. Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz, for his analyses of markets with asymmetric information. This recognition derives directly from his pioneering and influential article on “the market for lemons” (Akerlof 1970). According to Akerlof (2001a), the study of asymmetric information
“.. was a very first step toward the realization of a dream. That dream was the development of a behavioral macroeconomics in the original spirit of Keynes’ General Theory. Macroeconomics would then no longer suffer from the ad hockery of the neoclassical synthesis, which had over-ridden the emphasis in The General Theory on the role of psychological and sociological factors, such as cognitive bias, reciprocity, fairness, herding, and social status. My dream was to strengthen macroeconomic theory by incorporating assumptions honed to the observation of such behavior.” (365)
This concern with resurrecting the “animal spirits” that imbue Keynes’ General Theory – which has been a distinctive and enduring characteristic of Akerlof’s work (see Akerlof and Shiller 2009) – derives from his early interest to build “a theory that is more closely linked to substantial policy issues and less tied to the official (competitive general equilibrium) model and its assumptions” (Akerlof 2001b). Akerlof relates his gradual engagement with this academic viewpoint to his interest in history, which he claims has informed his research agenda, as well as to his short – albeit intense – involvement in journalism, and to the experiences he had while working in India.
Akerlof sees the development of behavioral macroeconomics as contributing novel and useful answers to questions which the New Classical synthesis has failed, in his view, to explain. It does so by replacing traditional utility-maximizing assumptions with empirical observations from psychology and sociology.
In his analyses of unemployment, Akerlof has been one of the proponents of the “efficiency wage” theory (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 1990), and has brought into his models concepts such as reciprocity (akin to the anthropological analysis of gift exchange), fairness and adherence to social norms.
In a similar vein, Akerlof has also devised ways to incorporate research and concepts from psychology (money illusion, loss aversion, herding, rules of thumb, cognitive parsimony, salience and hyperbolic discounting) into macroeconomic models that account for the effects of governmental intervention in the economy (Akerlof and Yellen 1985a and b), for observed regularities between unemployment and inflation (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996, 2000) and to an analysis of saving behavior (Akerlof 1991).
More recently Akerlof has been doing research which relates poverty and self-destructive behavior to the identity of individuals of historically excluded minorities, such as African Americans in the U.S. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
REFERENCES
Akerlof 1970. “The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics; 84, pp. 488–500.
Akerlof 1982. “ Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, pp. 543–69.
Akerlof 1991. “Procrastination and Obedience,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 81, pp. 1–19.
Akerlof 2001a. Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, 2001.
Akerlof 2001b. Autobigraphy at http://nobelprize.org/
Akerlof, William T. Dickens and George L. Perry 1996. William T. Dickens and George L. Perry, “The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:1, pp. 1–59.
Akerlof, William T. Dickens and George L. Perry 2000. ”Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting and the Long-Run Phillips Curve,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:1, pp. 1–44.
Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton 2000. “Economics and Identity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, pp. 715–53.
Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller 2009. Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen 1985a. “A Near-rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, pp. 823–38.
Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen 1985b. “Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?” American Economic Review, 75, pp. 708–20.
Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen 1990. “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, pp. 255–83.
Thomas Schelling's article on Bargaining, Communication and Limited War
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Some of you have asked me for Schelling's article - so here's the link:
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research Volume 1 Issue 2, Pages 198 - 217
Enjoy!!!
Some of you have asked me for Schelling's article - so here's the link:
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research Volume 1 Issue 2, Pages 198 - 217
Enjoy!!!
The TED Community Experiment on Intercultural Coordination presentation
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Here's a video presentation with a concise explanation of the theory behind the TED Community Experiment, as well as with some preliminary hints about possible interpretations of its results.
Thank you very much to all who participated. Please remember that your thoughts, questions and ideas are more than welcome - you can post them here as comments or you can send me an email to deliberationlab@gmail.com.
(For those of you interested in experimental game theory, I will soon be posting a working paper with a technical description of the research design and the statistical tests.)
Here's a video presentation with a concise explanation of the theory behind the TED Community Experiment, as well as with some preliminary hints about possible interpretations of its results.
Thank you very much to all who participated. Please remember that your thoughts, questions and ideas are more than welcome - you can post them here as comments or you can send me an email to deliberationlab@gmail.com.
(For those of you interested in experimental game theory, I will soon be posting a working paper with a technical description of the research design and the statistical tests.)
TED Community Experiment results
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Dear TED Community friends,
here are your results for the coordination / intercultural coordination experiment. Check to see if your answers match the most frequent ones - did you manage to coordinate with many others? The first part of the presentation shows general results, and the second part shows results disaggregated between those who played the coordination game and those who played the intercultural coordination game.
For an explanation of the theory behind this experiment and an analysis of its results and implications, please watch the presentation in the next post.
(Better if you view the presentation in full screen, by clicking on the "full" button of the presentation window.)
Thank you very much for taking part in this study!!!
Dear TED Community friends,
here are your results for the coordination / intercultural coordination experiment. Check to see if your answers match the most frequent ones - did you manage to coordinate with many others? The first part of the presentation shows general results, and the second part shows results disaggregated between those who played the coordination game and those who played the intercultural coordination game.
For an explanation of the theory behind this experiment and an analysis of its results and implications, please watch the presentation in the next post.
(Better if you view the presentation in full screen, by clicking on the "full" button of the presentation window.)
Thank you very much for taking part in this study!!!
Ted Community Experiment Results
View more presentations from Deliberation Lab.
Intercultural coordination experiment pilot test results
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Dear friends,
thank you very much for helping me out with the coordination / intercultural coordination experiment pilot test; it was very useful. As promised, here are your results - please bear in mind that this is not a scientifically valid experiment (it was implemented with a sample of 53 friends, and no statistical tests were run). A presentation with the results of the actual experiment, with scientifically valid results, and a presentation with its explanation and analysis will come in the next posts.
(Better if you view the presentation in full screen, by clicking on the "full" button of the presentation window.)
Thanks again, and remember you can always send me an email or post a comment with your thoughts.
Dear friends,
thank you very much for helping me out with the coordination / intercultural coordination experiment pilot test; it was very useful. As promised, here are your results - please bear in mind that this is not a scientifically valid experiment (it was implemented with a sample of 53 friends, and no statistical tests were run). A presentation with the results of the actual experiment, with scientifically valid results, and a presentation with its explanation and analysis will come in the next posts.
(Better if you view the presentation in full screen, by clicking on the "full" button of the presentation window.)
Thanks again, and remember you can always send me an email or post a comment with your thoughts.
Pilot Test Results
View more presentations from Deliberation Lab.
A starting point
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Welcome to the Deliberation Lab blog.
You probably landed here because you just played an experimental game; thank you for participating in the Lab's first online global project.
Please feel free to send the link to the game you played to more people - that way you will help increase the experiment's validity and your results will be much more meaningful.
Stay tuned - results, analysis and an explanation of this experiment will soon be posted.
(The easiest way for us to keep in touch is if you subscribe to this blog using any online RSS feeder, such as the Google Reader.)
Also, remember that you can always post a comment in this blog, or send an email to deliberationlab@gmail.com (for example, if you want to participate in more experiments).
All the best, thanks again and see you soon.
Welcome to the Deliberation Lab blog.
You probably landed here because you just played an experimental game; thank you for participating in the Lab's first online global project.
Please feel free to send the link to the game you played to more people - that way you will help increase the experiment's validity and your results will be much more meaningful.
Stay tuned - results, analysis and an explanation of this experiment will soon be posted.
(The easiest way for us to keep in touch is if you subscribe to this blog using any online RSS feeder, such as the Google Reader.)
Also, remember that you can always post a comment in this blog, or send an email to deliberationlab@gmail.com (for example, if you want to participate in more experiments).
All the best, thanks again and see you soon.
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